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  Using agricultural preservation priorities derived from an analytical hierarchy process by 23 
conservation experts from 18 agencies in the state of Delaware, this research uses weighted 
benefit measures to evaluate the historical success of Delaware’s agricultural protection fund, 
which spent nearly $100 million in its first decade. This research demonstrates how these op-
eration research techniques can be used in concert to address relevant conservation questions. 
Results suggest that the state’s sealed-bid-offer auction, which determines the yearly conser-
vation selections, is superior to benefit-targeting approaches frequently employed by conser-
vation organizations, but is inferior to the optimization technique of binary linear program-
ming that could have provided additional benefits to the state, such as 12,000 additional acres 
worth an estimated $25 million. 
 




In the United States, conservation groups spend 
an estimated $3.2 billion annually (Lerner, 
Mackey, and Casey 2007). While operations re-
search techniques are frequently used in a wide 
variety of areas, yielding substantial success, such 
techniques have rarely been applied to on-the-
ground conservation efforts despite the promise 
of providing more conservation benefits for the 
same budget constraint (Prendergast, Quinn, and 
Lawton 1999, Rodrigues and Gaston 2002, Az-
zaino, Conrad, and Ferraro 2002, Messer 2006). 
A partial explanation for this lack of adoption is 
that many of the initial analyses in operations 
research have focused on problem setups—such 
as covering problems that identify the minimum 
number of preserves necessary to protect a set 
number of endangered species or the maximum 
number of species that could be protected with a 
set of protected areas (e.g., Ando et al. 1998, 
Balmford et al. 2001, Polasky, Camm, and Gar-
ber-Yonts 2001, Moore et al. 2004, Strange et al. 
2006, Cabeza and Moilanen 2001, ReVelle, Wil-
liams, and Boland 2002)—that have little rela-
tionship to the actual priorities and problems 
faced by conservation organizations. Secondly, 
conservation objectives and goals tend to be diffi-
cult to characterize, identify, and measure, and 
lack a common metric for success, such as profit 
in business applications. Furthermore, other ob-
stacles exist for the use of these techniques for 
conservation, including how to identify the true 
decision-space for the conservation group, which 
must first locate willing sellers, develop the mean-
ing of the measures of conservation benefit, 
assess the relative importance of one environ-
mental characteristic over another, and provide 
reliable, arm’s-length estimates of the costs in-
volved (Strager and Rosenberger 2006). In this 
research, we show the benefits of applying op-
erations research techniques in a setting where 
these latter obstacles have already been essen-
_________________________________________ 
Kent Messer is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Food and 
Resource Economics and the Department of Economics at the Univer-
sity of Delaware in Newark, Delaware. Will Allen is the Director of 
Strategic Conservation at The Conservation Fund in Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina. 
 The authors would like to acknowledge the generous assistance of 
Michael McGrath and Robin West of the Delaware Department of 
Agriculture. Helpful input was provided by Blaine Phillips, Ole Amund-
sen, and Ted Weber of The Conservation Fund. Financial support for 
this project came from the Allerton Foundation, the Fair Play Founda-
tion, and the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation.Messer and Allen  Enhancing Agricultural Preservation Strategies   443 
 
 
tially overcome given the existing program pri-
orities of the Delaware Agricultural Lands Pres-
ervation Foundation (DALPF) and its historical 
data of willing sellers’ offers, parcels’ market ap-
praisals, GIS information on parcels’ agricultural 
and ecological value, and a gathering of conser-
vation experts to help determine the relative value 
of different agricultural and ecological measures. 
  The most common approach in the economics 
literature for evaluating the benefits of agricul-
tural land preservation is willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) surveys of the public (e.g., Bergstrom, 
Dillman, and Stoll 1985, Halstead 1984, Kline 
and Wichelns, 1996, 1998, Duke and Ilvento 
2004, Ozdemir et al. 2004, Johnston and Duke 
2009, Duke and Johnston 2010).
1 However, other 
studies have explicitly examined the public’s pref-
erences for different attribute trade-offs inevitably 
involved in conservation settings by employing 
the technique of analytic hierarchy process (AHP) 
(e.g., Duke and Aull-Hyde 2002, Strager and 
Rosenberger 2006).
2 
  This research provides a template by which the 
techniques of AHP (Saaty 1982) and binary linear 
programming can be used in concert to address 
conservation issues.
3 Binary linear programming 
can be structured to achieve the results that meet 
or exceed the results achieved using benefit-cost 
ratio prioritization that has recently been advo-
cated by Duke and Johnston (2010). To illustrate 
the benefits of using such an approach, we pre-
sent a case study involving protection of agricul-
tural land in Delaware—a state that, along with 
Connecticut and Rhode Island, has been one of 
the most studied agricultural preservation pro-
grams (Duke and Aull-Hyde 2002, Duke and Il-
vento 2004, Duke 2004, Duke and Lynch 2007, 
Johnston and Duke 2009). 
  This research contributes to the existing litera-
ture by analyzing parcel-level benefit and cost 
data from actual willing sellers—in this case 
those who applied to sell a conservation easement 
to DALPF—instead of making assumptions about 
which parcels may be offered for enrollment to 
                                                                                    
1 For a recent review of this literature see Bergstrom and Ready 
(2009). 
2 Duke and Aull-Hyde (2002) provide a good overview of the AHP 
process and how it can be applied to evaluate different conservation 
attributes. 
3 This research effort is similar in spirit to the paper by Wilson, 
Reely, and Cox (1997) that sought to address the problems faced by 
real-world water resource management systems. 
the conservation organization. This research is 
similar to other studies that have used multiple-
objective criteria and stakeholder preferences (e.g., 
Ferraro 2003a, Strager and Rosenberger 2006, 
Messer 2006). In this case, the multiple objectives 
were weighted by a leadership forum of 23 
conservation experts from 18 conservation agen-
cies who participated in a group AHP exercise. 
This analysis directly compares the overall results 
obtained by the existing preservation system with 
what would have occurred if either benefit-
targeting or binary linear programming algo-
rithms had been employed. 
  The context of agricultural land protection in 
Delaware was selected, in part, because of the 
rapidly increasing threat of suburban housing de-
velopment to the state’s rural character and his-
toric agricultural economy and, in part, because 
of the richness of the data in this area as a result 
of more than a decade of agricultural protection. 
This research contributes to the literature by 
outlining how the operations research techniques 
of AHP and binary linear programming can be 
used in concert to promote agricultural preserva-
tion. This research directly measures the magni-
tude of the benefits of this approach by compar-
ing the results both quantitatively and spatially 
with those derived by Delaware’s historic preser-
vation strategy and another strategy frequently 





Delaware is the second smallest state in the 
United States (1.25 million acres) and has a 
population of approximately 850,000 residents, of 
which more than 60 percent live in the northern-
most county of New Castle, which contains the 
historic business center of Wilmington and the 
University of Delaware in Newark. Over the past 
decade, the population of the state has been 
growing at rates nearly 28 percent faster than the 
rest of the United States. While the population of 
Wilmington is projected to decrease over the next 
30 years, the state’s population is projected to 
grow by more than 230,000 people (McMahon, 
Mastran, and Phillips 2004). Consequently, most 
of the population growth will be accommodated 
by converting agricultural lands to residential 
uses. Given the scale of development occurring 
and slated to occur, the American Farmland Trust 444    October 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
has designated the Mid-Atlantic coastal plain, 
including all of Delaware, to be “endangered” 
(American Farmland Trust 1997). 
  Agriculture is Delaware’s top industry, with a 
production value of $995 million in 2007, and 
approximately one out of seven Delawareans is 
employed in agriculture or a related industry 
(USDA 2009). Delaware is ranked fifth in the 
country in terms of percentage of area used as 
farmland (41.2 percent of the entire state). Be-
tween 1997 and 2007, Delaware lost 600 farms 
and 70,000 acres of farmland, in large part due to 
pressures from urbanization. 
  DALPF was formed in July 1991. Funding 
comes primarily from the state but also includes 
local and federal matching dollars. Landowner 
participation in the program is voluntary and in-
volves two components. First, landowners join 
the program by enrolling in an agricultural pres-
ervation district (APD). To be eligible, they must 
commit at least 200 contiguous acres that are de-
voted to agricultural and related uses or have their 
land within three miles of an existing APD. As 
noted in Duke (2004), given the wide geographic 
dispersion of the APDs throughout the small 
state, these rules mean that essentially all land-
owners in Delaware are eligible to become part of 
an APD, and thus participate in the DALPF 
program. Landowners who place land parcels into 
an APD agree to not develop the land for at least 
10 years, devoting the land only to agriculture 
and related uses. In return, owners receive tax 
benefits, right-to-farm protection, and an oppor-
tunity to sell a preservation easement to the state 
that permanently prohibits nonagricultural devel-
opment. As of 2004, there were 134,747 acres in 
564 APD-designated areas. Another 411 proper-
ties encompassing nearly 76,800 acres (57 per-
cent of the total) had been permanently protected 
through the purchase of preservation easements at 
a total expense of more than $90 million. 
  As is described in detail later, DALPF chooses 
parcels to protect using an auction mechanism 
and selects easements to purchase based on the 
highest percentage discount submitted by the 
landowner relative to the parcel’s appraised mar-
ket value. For example, if the easement is ap-
praised at $1 million and a landowner offers a 40 
percent discount that is accepted via the auction 
mechanism, DALPF pays the landowner $600,000 
for the easement. This strategy (hereafter referred 
to as the DALPF algorithm) thereby selects par-
cels that cost the least relative to their appraised 
values. However, DALPF’s algorithm does not 
maximize aggregate conservation benefits relative 
to the cost, a task that could be accomplished with 
optimization techniques such as binary linear 
programming (hereafter referred to as the OPT 
algorithm). 
  To test this hypothesis and measure the effi-
ciency gains that might be achieved, this research 
built on recent work by The Conservation Fund 
(TCF) to develop a “green infrastructure assess-
ment” for Kent County, Delaware (Allen et al. 
2006). This effort involved development of a 
statewide green infrastructure network design and 
evaluation of a full array of conservation oppor-
tunities (Weber 2007). To assist this process, a 
leadership forum was convened in the city of 
Dover that consisted of 23 stakeholders represent-
ing 18 private conservation partners and local, 
state, and federal government agencies.
4 Partici-
pants were provided with overviews of various 
agricultural and ecological geographic informa-
tion system (GIS) data sources, and forum par-
ticipants provided feedback on the quality and 
accuracy of this information (also referred to as 
layers). 
  Forum participants were then led through an 
analytical hierarchy process (AHP) to establish 
priorities and how those priorities should be 
weighted in guiding agricultural conservation in 
Delaware (Saaty 1982). The AHP process is a 
quantitative method for ranking decision alterna-
tives by developing a numerical score to rank 
each decision alternative based on how well each 
alternative meets the decision maker’s criteria. 
AHP relies on pairwise comparisons, which is a 
process where stakeholders compare the value of 
each individual criterion with every factor in their 
decision making criteria, resulting in a matrix that 
reflects weights for all factors. When used in a 
conservation planning process, the stakeholders 
compare the relative value of GIS layers for de-
termining the weights used in a particular benefit 
model. 
  To develop this assessment, the stakeholders 
were asked to evaluate Delaware’s land evalua-
tion (LE) and site assessment (SA) layers for ag-
ricultural lands and the value of the “core green 
                                                                                    
4 For a detailed description of the leadership forum see Allen et al. 
(2006), pp. 9–10. Messer and Allen  Enhancing Agricultural Preservation Strategies   445 
 
 
infrastructure” (Core GI) layers (Figure 1).
5 The 
LESA system is a widely used GIS-based deci-
sion making tool for evaluation and prioritization 
of agricultural lands suitable for preservation. 
LESA scores are traditionally assigned to an en-
tire parcel, and thus represent the agricultural 
suitability of an average acre of land for a par-
ticular parcel. LESA is comprised of two parts. 
The LE factor measures agricultural and/or forest 
productivity based primarily on soils and land 
cover. The SA factor measures multiple impacts 
on long-term productivity and other environ-
mental, economic, and social factors, including 
development potential, proximity to existing 
farming operations, utilization of farm programs, 
whether the farm is owner-occupied, and the bio-
diversity value of the parcel. 
  In an effort to identify and prioritize the areas 
of greatest ecological importance within the 
state’s natural ecosystems, Delaware’s Core GI 
was designated from a series of statewide GIS 
layers. The Core GI is defined as an intercon-
nected network of natural areas, green spaces, and 
working landscapes that protect natural ecological 
processes and support wildlife (Allen et al. 2006). 
Designation of the Core GI is based on the prin-
ciples of landscape ecology and conservation bi-
ology, providing a scientifically defensible frame-
work for green infrastructure protection statewide 
(Benedict and McMahon 2006). Specifically, core 
forests, wetlands, and aquatic systems were de-
lineated based on natural ecosystems in the state 
that generally were contiguous, undisturbed natu-
ral features meeting certain size and quality thresh-
olds (Weber 2007). 
  For the leadership forum, a manual approach 
was used by creating a written questionnaire that 
included pairwise comparisons for each factor 
involved in five benefit measures: LE, SA, Core 
Forests, Core Wetlands, and Core Aquatic Sys-
tems.
6 The results from the questionnaires were 
tabulated after the meeting and entered into Ex-
pert Choice™ software, which calculated the fi-
                                                                                    
5 Forum participants also considered data layers related to forestry 
that had been developed by the state and other GIS layers developed by 
TCF related to the quality of other natural resources, water quality, and 
housing development. However, forum participants decided that these 
other data sets were not relevant to agricultural land protection in Dela-
ware so they are excluded from this analysis. 
6 See Weber (2007, p. 30, Figure 3) for an illustration of the pairwise 
comparisons used in the project. 
nal benefit weights. These benefit weights were 
added to GIS layers in ESRI ArcGIS™ software 
for each benefit measure, creating a raster GIS 
surface representing relative benefit values. The 
spatial analysis used a technique called “zonal 
statistics,” which is an ESRI ArcToolbox function 
that calculates the mean for all raster surface val-
ues that fall within a parcel’s boundaries. The 
benefit values were applied to individual parcels, 
resulting in a benefit value representing the aver-
age value for each benefit measure for each par-
cel. The AHP process with the leadership forum 
defined agricultural benefits using the scores of 
three factors—Core GI, LE, and SA. The results 
of this process were that the SA benefit measure-
ment being weighted the most, 56 percent, with 
the Core GI and LE measurements being weighted 
32 percent and 12 percent, respectively. 
 
Preservation Strategies and Algorithms 
 
To determine appropriate measures of benefits 
and costs, we compared the results of three pri-
mary tools: the selection algorithm used by 
DALPF, optimization using binary linear pro-
gramming (OPT), and benefit targeting (BT)—the 
latter being the most common algorithm used by 
conservation groups. In this research, the OPT 
and BT algorithms use the benefit measurements 
derived from the AHP pairwise comparisons, 
while the DALPF algorithm utilizes a non-AHP 
method, percent discount from appraisal value. 
Each algorithm recommends a different selection 
of agricultural parcels for preservation by conser-
vation easement. A commonality among them is 
the method by which the benefits and costs of a 
particular parcel are measured. 
  First, consider an Aij matrix where i=1, 2, . . ., I 
denotes an index for parcels of land, and j=1, 
2, . . ., J denotes the index of benefits. The con-
servation value of the ith parcel for the jth at-
tribute is thus denoted by Aij ≥ 0. Each of the J 
attributes is assigned a subjective weight that is 
denoted  Wj. This weight reflects the relative 
importance a conservation organization gives to 
that attribute. Consequently, the conservation value 













Figure 1. Map of Core Green Infrastructure Areas in the State of Delaware 
 
Thus, the three algorithms analyze identical bene-
fit measurements, benefit-weighting priorities 
determined by AHP, and the cost information for 
each parcel. As a result, differences between the 
algorithm selections come not from using differ-
ent data but from how the measurements and Messer and Allen  Enhancing Agricultural Preservation Strategies   447 
 
 
weights are used to select parcels for preserva-
tion. 
  The program costs for each parcel, Ci, are cal-
culated by multiplying the appraised market value 
for the parcel, Mi, multiplied by the discount, Di, 




(2)  * iii CD M = . 
 
Benefit Targeting (BT) Algorithm 
 
The BT, also referred to as a rank-based algo-
rithm, is the selection algorithm commonly used 
by conservation organizations (Azzaino, Conrad, 
and Ferraro 2002, Ferraro 2003b, Naidoo et al. 
2006, Messer 2006, Wilson et al. 2006). In this 
approach, the organization ranks potential parcels 
for conservation from highest to lowest based on 
the parcels’ total benefits. BT can be viewed as a 
type of “greedy agent” algorithm: once all parcels 
have been ranked, the agency seeks to purchase 
easements on parcels with the highest conserva-
tion values that it can afford from the set of top-
ranked unprotected parcels. Through an iterative 
process, easements are acquired until the agency’s 
budget, B, is exhausted. 
  The BT selection algorithm can be written for-
mally as follows. Let R(⋅) denote the rank opera-
tor over all conservation values, Vi, and let Ri = 
R(V1, . . ., VI) be the rank of the ith parcel. The 
parcel(s) with the highest Vi receive a rank of 1. 
Let Xi = {0,1}, where Xi = 0 indicates that the ith 
parcel is not recommended for acquisition, and 
where Xi = 1 indicates that the ith parcel is rec-
ommended for acquisition. The resulting vector, 
X = [X1, X 2, . . ., XI], represents the portfolio of 
the conservation organization, and initially X is a 
vector of zeros. If the conservation organization 
uses its financial resources to acquire parcel i = 7, 
X7 changes from X7 = 0 to X7 = 1. 
  After all of the parcels have been ranked, they 
are arrayed in the following format: 
 
                                                                                    
7 In this analysis, parcel costs refer only to the DALPF program 
expenditures associated with purchasing the easement and do not take 
into account the government or society costs which would need to 
include other factors, such as the reduction of taxes due to the parcel’s 
preserved status. 
RANK  PARCELS  COST 
1  Xi, Xk  Ci, Ck 
2  Xl  Cl 
3  Xm  Cm 
.  . . 
R Xr  Cr 
 
If parcels have equal rankings, the conservation 
organization seeks to acquire an easement for the 
parcel that costs the least. For instance, if parcels 
i and k are ranked the highest and have the same 
conservation value and Ci < Ck, then 
 
Xi = 1  if  Ci ≤ B 
Xi = 0  if  Ci > B 
Xk = 1  if  Ck ≤ B – XiCi  
Xk = 0  if  Ck > B – XiCi. 
 
The conservation organization would then con-
tinue working through the list of ranked parcels 
until all available money was exhausted. 
  Despite its widespread use in the conservation 
community, BT can lead to inefficient results from 
both an economic and conservation perspective 
(Underhill 1994, Rodrigues, Cerdeir, and Gaston 
2000, Rodrigues and Gaston 2002, Messer 2006). 
The source of the problem is that a parcel’s price 
is explicitly factored into the decision process 
only to determine whether there is enough money 
still available or in the uncommon cases where 




DALPF historically has defined a parcel’s bene-
fits purely by the price of the easement offered by 
the landowner within a sealed-bid, discriminatory 
auction mechanism. For each annual funding cy-
cle, DALPF pays for an appraisal of the parcel’s 
easement value to any landowner participating in 
an APD who expresses an interest in selling his or 
her development rights. After receiving the ap-
praisal, the landowner can choose to continue the 
process by offering a percentage discount on the 
value of the easement by way of a sealed bid. 
Upon receiving the landowners’ offers, DALPF 
ranks the offers by the percentage of the ap-
praised value offered as a discount and purchases 
easements from owners who make the best of-448    October 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
fers—those with the largest discounts—until the 
budget for that particular cycle is exhausted. This 
auction system can be characterized as a “receive 
what you offer” auction (also referred to as a dis-
criminative auction) since it pays each landowner 
a different amount based on the discount offered. 
Finally, the selected parcels are professionally sur-
veyed and the landowner receives payment based 
on the percent discount offered and the survey 
results. 
  An advantage of the DALPF selection algo-
rithm is that, by making cost the sole determinant 
of the selection algorithm, by definition DALPF 
secures land with the greatest easement value 
given its budget constraint. This goal of maximiz-
ing total easement value is different than the ob-
jective of most agricultural protection programs, 
which tend to seek to maximize the number of 
acres protected (Lynch and Musser 2001). How-
ever, the DALPF system does not guarantee that 
parcels with the greatest agricultural or other an-
cillary ecosystem values are the ones that are pro-
tected. That occurs only if, by chance, the owners 
of those lands offer the largest discounts.
8 Of par-
ticular concern is whether owners of agricultural 
land of marginal value may offer DALPF a high 
discount in part because there are few other 
buyers given the land’s low quality. Similarly, the 
appraised value of an easement for farms near 
growing urban areas may be high due to develop-
ment potential, and DALPF would therefore be 
acquiring parcels that, even when discounted the 
most, are more expensive than parcels of similar 
quality that do not face such development pres-
sure. 
  Formally, the DALPF algorithm can be ex-
pressed as a variant of the BT algorithm since it 
ranks the percent discounts from highest to low-
est, and then, like a benefit-oriented, “greedy” 
agent, dictates purchases of easements for parcels 
with the highest ranking discounts until the bud-
get, B, is exhausted. In this case, under BT, let 
P(⋅) denote the rank operator over all percentage 
                                                                                    
8 The process of selecting parcels based solely on the percent dis-
count offered can be compared to a grocery shopper who buys a food 
item only because it is marked down in price more than any other item. 
However, the item on sale may not be very desirable to the shopper. 
Likewise, problems can arise if the foods with the most deeply dis-
counted prices are also the most expensive (for instance, caviar or truf-
fles). Thus, they are relatively more expensive, even with the large dis-
count, than other high-quality foods with a smaller percentage cut in 
price. 
discounts, Di, and let Pi = R(D1, . . ., DI) be the 
rank of the ith parcel, such that the parcel with 
the greatest value for Di receives a rank of 1. 
Again, let Xi = {0,1}. After ranking all of the par-
cels, DALPF proceeds down the ranked list, pur-
chasing easements until the available money is 
exhausted. Consider three parcels: i, k, and l. 
 
RANK  PARCELS 
PERCENTAGE 
DISCOUNT 
1  Xi  Di 
2  Xk  Dk 
3  Xl  Dl 
 
DALPF would select acquisitions in a similar man-
ner but would select the parcel with the greatest 
benefit, Vi, if two parcels received the same rank. 
Thus, 
 
 X i = 1  if   Di ≤ B 
 X i = 0  if   Di > B 
 
 X k = 1  if   Dk ≤ B – XiDi 
 X k = 0  if   Dk > B – XiDi 
 
 X l = 1   if   Dl ≤ B – (XiDi + XkDk)  
 X l = 0  if   Dl > B – (XiDi + XkDk), 
 
and so on. 
 
Optimization (OPT) Algorithm 
 
The OPT algorithm uses the same parcel-specific 
benefit information as BT and the DALPF algo-
rithm but, in addition, it specifically accounts for 
the cost of each potential purchase and seeks to 
identify the most cost-effective solution. Thus, 
instead of identifying the individual parcels with 
the greatest benefits, OPT considers all possible 
combinations of parcels given the budget con-
straint and selects a set of acquisitions that guar-
antees the maximum possible total benefit. To 
consider the vast number of possible combina-
tions involved, OPT is computer-driven and uses 
the branch-and-bound algorithm to solve the bi-
nary linear programming problem. In this study, 
the calculations were done using the Optimization 
Decision Support Tool that incorporates the Pre-
mium Solver Platform (version 6.5). Messer and Allen  Enhancing Agricultural Preservation Strategies   449 
 
 
  If all of the parcels’ acquisition costs and all of 
the parcels’ benefits scores are identical, OPT, 
DALPF, and BT would yield an identical, optimal 
set of parcels. However, in the vast majority of 
real-world cases, these costs and benefits are het-
erogeneous. In general, the efficiency of OPT is 
greatest when parcels’ benefits and costs are posi-
tively correlated (Babcock et al. 1997), especially 
when costs are relatively more variable than bene-
fits (Ferraro 2003b). 
  OPT uses binary linear programming, which 
limits the standard integer linear programming of 
a branch-and-bound algorithm to values of either 
0 or 1. In this case, the binary choice is to “pro-
tect” (Xi = 1) or “not protect” (Xi = 0) a particular 
parcel. Unlike the BT or DALPF algorithms, the 
OPT algorithm takes into account both benefits 
and costs for each parcel at each step of the proc-
ess, evaluates all of the possible purchase combi-
nations that lie within the specified budget con-
straint, and selects the portfolio that yields the 
greatest possible aggregate conservation value, 




















≤ ∑ . 
 
For this research, the tolerance in the Premium 
Solver Platform was set to zero and no problems 
with nonconvergence were encountered, as the 




This analysis evaluates the efficiency of DALPF’s 
selection algorithm by comparing its historical 
results with estimations of what BT and OPT 
would have accomplished given the same budget 
and the same set of potential parcels to acquire. 
The analysis considers data provided by Dela-
ware’s Department of Agriculture (DDA) related 
to 524 parcels. All of the parcels were located in 
designated APDs and the landowners had re-
ceived a third-party appraisal (a necessary precur-
sor to selling the development rights to DALPF). 
  Traditionally, after the auction cycle is com-
pleted, DDA compiles the data for all successful 
sellers and uses aggregate information regarding 
the number of acres preserved, the average bid of 
the successful sellers, and the total easement 
value protected. This information is then released 
in a public announcement regarding the successes 
of the program. The data from unsuccessful sell-
ers is not generally reported to the public other 
than being part of the calculation of the total 
number of bids that were received for a given 
cycle. For this research, DDA staff made avail-
able data for the approximately 124 parcels that 
were not selected due to the landowner submit-
ting a non-winning discount offer (an offer that 
was lower in percentage terms than the lowest 
accepted discount offer). We then matched to 
each of the 524 parcels the agricultural and eco-
logical benefit information derived by TCF’s GIS 
analysis of Delaware’s Green Infrastructure (Al-
len et al. 2006) that was presented to the conser-
vation leadership forum. Of the 524 parcels ac-
quired, 509 (97.1 percent) provided sufficient data 
for use in this research.
9 
  In this set of 509 parcels, the average size was 
171.7 acres, with the smallest being 4.7 acres, the 
largest being 1,092.1 acres, and a standard devia-
tion of 152.2. Total acreage for all 509 parcels 
was 87,406.7. A parcel’s overall LESA value was 
calculated based on the leadership forum’s weight-
ings for the LE and SA benefit measures, where 
the SA measure was weighted more than four 
times greater than the LE measure as previously 
described. The per-acre average LESA scores 
ranged from 38.3 to 90.4, with a mean of 69.2 
and a standard deviation of 8.9. The range of per-
acre Core GI scores was slightly larger, from 11.0 
to 80.3, and had a larger standard deviation of 
14.3 since the average and median values for the 
Core GI were considerably lower—23.2 and 16.5, 
respectively. The highest percentage discount of-
fered by a landowner was 100 percent (donation) 
and the lowest was 0 percent (no discount of-
fered); the average discount was 42.3 percent.
10 
                                                                                    
9 The other 15 land parcels presented significant data problems, such 
as missing appraisal values, multiple records for the same project in 
one cycle, or inconsistent measures of the parcel’s size. 
10 This research makes the assumption that landowners would have 
submitted the same discounts regardless of whether the DALPF, OPT, 
or BT algorithms were employed by the state for agricultural protec-
tion. This clearly is a strong assumption as landowners would be ex-
pected to respond to the incentives provided by the different selection 
algorithms. The potential bias is likely greatest for the BT as owners of 
high quality agricultural lands would have little incentive to offer any 
discount if they knew that the state’s acquisition decision would be  450    October 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Given these discounts, DDA would have needed 
a total budget of $127.7 million to acquire all 509 
parcels. The average parcel cost $250,884 after 
the discount was applied. The cost of the most ex-
pensive parcel exceeded $3.5 million, even after a 
39 percent discount. The average appraisal value 
per acre for the sample was $2,476.20, providing 
an average price of $1,585.70 per acre after dis-
counts were applied. In the first nine cycles com-
pleted, DALPF purchased rights for 382 of the 
509 parcels (75.0 percent). The cost of the 382 
parcels summed to slightly less than $93 million; 
therefore, a budget constraint of $93 million was 
set for use with all three selection algorithms. To 
facilitate comparisons of relative efficiency, the 
algorithms were applied to a single data set of all 
509 parcels representing a single simultaneous 
cycle.
11 
  Data for the two agricultural benefit measures 
(LESA and Core GI) were normalized to a scale 
from zero to one and then scaled by the size of 
the parcel under consideration. Normalization es-
tablishes a common metric for each of the 
attributes while preserving the parcel’s scores for 
each attribute. The normalization equation is     
max , ij ij j NV A A =  where 
max
j A  represents the high-
est scores for each of the agricultural benefit meas-
ures. Consequently, a parcel with the highest at-
tribute score has a normalized score of 1 for that 
attribute. Since the agricultural benefit measures 
represent an average value for the entire parcel, 
scaling the score by the number of acres in the 
parcel was necessary to ensure that the algorithms 
did not artificially favor small parcels (see the 





Table 1 and Figure 2 show the results of when the 
DALPF, BT, and OPT algorithms are used to se-
                                                                                    
based solely on the land’s agricultural quality. Therefore, the estimates 
of the inefficiencies of the BT are likely a lower bound, as acquisition 
costs would have been expected to increase. However, economic 
theory offers little insight on whether landowners would submit 
different offers when facing the OPT versus the DALPF algorithms. 
While this empirical question is beyond the scope of this research, 
laboratory economics experiments may be able to provide some 
insights into this issue. 
11 By treating all of the acquisition decisions as a simultaneous choice, 
this analysis does not take into account uncertainty. For good examples 
of how to account for decision over time see Messina and Bosetti 
(2006) and Messina and Bosetti (2003). 
lect acquisitions from the set of 509 parcels given 
a $93 million budget. The first scenario shows the 
aggregate results from the DALPF algorithm. The 
DALPF algorithm yielded the highest levels of 
total easement value at more than $162 million 
for the $93 million spent.
12 This result is not sur-
prising, since, as discussed above, by definition 
the DALPF algorithm makes the discount from 
total easement value its sole decision criteria in its 
auction mechanism—and thus by definition it 
maximizes the total easement value given the 
program applicants. The average discount was 
47.4 percent. DALPF protected 65,683.4 acres 
with an aggregate LESA score of 4,460,437 and 
aggregate Core GI score of 1,736,429.
13 Of the 
386 parcels protected, 12.4 percent were in mostly 
developed New Castle County, while 47.9 per-
cent and 39.6 percent were in the agriculturally 
rich counties of Kent and Sussex, respectively.
14 
  The BT and OPT analyses defined benefits ac-
cording to the AHP results from the leadership 
forum, which gave a 68 percent weight to the 
combined LESA scores and a 32 percent weight 
to the Core GI scores.
15 The aggregate results 
from the BT analysis were consistent with those 
of the DALPF algorithm in terms of the number 
of acres protected (just 71.5 acres fewer), the ag-
gregate LESA score (1.3 percent higher), and 
                                                                                    
12 Total easement value measures the undiscounted appraisal value of 
the parcel and is a statistic frequently used by DALPF as an estimation 
of how its protection strategy yields benefits worth more than the ac-
quisition costs. 
13 Unlike number of acres, aggregate scores for LESA and Core GI 
are not necessarily intuitive to interpret since they have been scaled by 
parcel size. However, the numbers are cardinal. 
14 In many conservation contexts, especially those dealing with habi-
tat protection, the issue of adjacency is a top priority and is an impor-
tant area of research [for instance, see Hof and Bevers (2000)]. How-
ever, in the context of agricultural preservation, adjacency is not as 
important, as one of the goals is to retain a healthy agricultural econ-
omy throughout the state. Therefore, issues of adjacency will not be 
specially addressed in this research beyond the discussion of the spatial 
distributions evident in Figure 3. 
15 This analysis does not examine the sensitivity of the results to the 
benefit weights provided through the AHP process, but instead seeks to 
make direct comparisons between outcomes from different algorithms 
given historical data from willing sellers while holding constant a set 
of benefit weights that were derived via an AHP process. Changes in 
the weighting would certainly affect which parcels were acquired by 
the BT and OPT algorithms and would also affect the aggregate results 
for the DALPF algorithm (though changes in the weighting would not 
change which parcels were selected by DALPF). Even with changes in 
the weighting of the different attributes, the research’s general finding 
that the OPT algorithm would provide significantly higher agricultural 
and ecological benefits compared to the DALPF or BT algorithms would 
likely remain unchanged. For examples of how sensitive results can be 
to changes in weights for multiple objectives, see Malczewski (1999), 
Cattaneo et al. (2006), and Strager and Rosenberger (2007). Messer and Allen  Enhancing Agricultural Preservation Strategies   451 
 
 
Table 1. Benefit Results 

















386 $92,986,682 $162,582,371 48 185  153  65,683.4  4,640,437  1,736,429
BT LESA  (68%) 
Core GI (32%) 
237 $92,997,985 $151,706,558 29 121 87 65,611.9  4,701,728  1,831,548
OPT LESA  (68%) 
Core GI (32%) 
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distribution of the protected parcels across the 
state (see Table 1). The most significant differ-
ence was that BT produced those results by se-
lecting easements on 38.6 percent fewer parcels 
and earning $10.9 million less in total easement 
value. Compared to DALPF’s algorithm, BT se-
lected, on average, larger parcels (an average of 
277.1 acres for BT compared to 170.2 acres for 
DALPF) that offered higher average scores for 
LESA (19,839 compared to 12,022) and Core GI 
(7,728 compared to 4,499). 
  The OPT algorithm produced more conserva-
tion benefits than either the DALPF or BT algo-
rithms, as it protected 447 parcels (15.8 percent 
percent more than DALPF and nearly double the 
number protected by BT) with the same $93 mil-
lion budget (Table 1). This outcome is expected 
since the DALPF algorithm gives sole priority to 
the percent discount offered by the landowner 
and thus maximizes easement value. If the sole 
benefit used in OPT was easement value instead 
of the number of acres and the LESA and Core 
GI scores, then the results from the DALPF algo-
rithm and OPT would have been identical. 
  OPT also protected 20.5 percent more acres 
(13,446.1) and yielded aggregate LESA and Core 
GI values that were 20.6 percent and 19.1 percent 
higher, respectively, than DALPF. Similarly, in 
comparison to BT, the OPT algorithm protected 
20.6 percent more acres and produced aggregate 
LESA and Core GI values that were 19.1 percent 
and 12.9 percent higher. Importantly, these gains 
in conservation benefit did not occur by pur-
chasing smaller farms—in fact, the size of the 
average farm protected by OPT was 7 acres (4.0 
percent) larger than the one protected by the 
DALPF algorithm. 
  Another means for evaluating efficiencies or 
the relative cost effectiveness is to estimate the 
difference in cost between the sets of acquisitions 
produced by each algorithm. Using the set of 509 
parcels described previously, we calculated the 
potential savings of using OPT. Recall that the 
OPT algorithm would have acquired 447 parcels 
at a total cost of $92,999,225 and that this portfo-
lio of parcels would have yielded 79,129.5 acres. 
We allowed the DALPF algorithm to spend addi-
tional money (beyond the original budget of $93 
million) until it achieved an equivalent or slightly 
greater number of acres than the OPT selection. 
As seen in Table 2, DALPF required $113,693,669 
to acquire 79,175.8 acres—an additional cost of 
$20.7 million. A similar analysis for BT resulted 
in spending an additional $19.8 million to achieve 
an equivalent number of acres. In both cases, the 
additional funds provided aggregate values for 
the LESA and Core GI benefits that were quite 
similar to those achieved by OPT with the budget 
of $93 million (Table 2). 
  It is interesting to note that, as demonstrated in 
Figure 3, despite a wide range in the number of 
parcels selected—from a low of 237 by BT to a 
high of 447 with OPT—the geographic distribu-
tion of the parcels is fairly similar. For example, 
the share of parcel acquisitions located in Kent 
County was similar for all three applications—
47.9 percent for DALPF, 51.5 percent for BT, 
and 51.9 percent for OPT. The next largest group 
of parcels came from Sussex County and the re-
sults were similar—39.6 percent for DALPF, 36.7 
percent for BT, and 39.4 percent for OPT. This 
result would be beneficial from a political per-
spective, as OPT’s statewide efficiency gains did 
not require one county being favored more than 
another any more than the DALPF algorithm has 
historically done.
16 
  For the sake of making the direct comparisons 
presented above, this analysis assumes that land-
owners would have submitted the identical dis-
counts regardless of which selection algorithms 
were used by the state. This clearly is a strong as-
sumption, as landowners would be expected to 
respond differently to the incentives provided by 
the different selection algorithms. For instance, 
owners of high quality agricultural lands would 
have little incentive to offer any discount if they 
knew that the state’s acquisition decision used the 
BT algorithm and would be solely based on the 
land’s agricultural quality. Therefore, the results 
presented here are likely to understate the effi-
ciency loss of using the BT algorithm. However, 
economic theory offers little insight on the more 
important question of whether landowners of dif-
ferent types of land would submit different dis-
count offers when facing the OPT versus the 
DALPF algorithms. Ultimately, this is an empiri-
cal question beyond the scope of this research. 
 
                                                                                    
16 Additional inspection of Figure 3 shows that the OPT acquires a 
larger number of possible parcels in the southwest section of Kent 
County and northwest Sussex County. Messer and Allen  Enhancing Agricultural Preservation Strategies   453 
 
 







Parcels Total  Cost 
Difference 
from OPT 
OPT   79,129.5    5,597,928    2,067,438    447    $92,999,225  -- 
DALPF   79,175.8    5,600,126    2,082,259    460   $113,693,669  $20,694,444 
BT   79,161.8    5,605,649    2,106,844    355    $112,798,298  $19,799,073 
 
 
DALPF Optimization Benefit Targeting
 
Figure 3. Selected Parcels by Preservation Algorithm: Kent County, Southern New Castle 




This research has applied the operations research 
techniques of the analytical hierarchy process 
(AHP) and optimization through binary linear 
programming to the problem of agricultural pres-
ervation in the state of Delaware. This research 
demonstrates how these two techniques can be 
used in a complementary manner to develop an 
analysis that is meaningful for on-the-ground 
conservation efforts. 
  This analysis of the selection process used by 
the Delaware Agricultural Lands Preservation 
Foundation (DALPF) shows that the current sys-
tem offers a number of positive characteristics, 
such as a competitive auction structure and provi-
sion of free appraisals to increase the number of 
potential sellers. DALPF’s algorithm maximizes 
the total aggregate easement value and yields 
aggregate results that are consistent with those 
generated by benefits targeting (BT), an algo-
rithm that is commonly used in conservation set-
tings. However, DALPF’s algorithm can become 
considerably more effective by more appropri-
ately incorporating cost into its existing structure. 
For example, in Delaware, the use of binary lin-
ear programming could have preserved 13,446 
more acres for the same cost. An alternative way 
of viewing this gain in cost effectiveness is that 
optimization could have allowed DALPF to pre-
serve additional agricultural lands worth an esti-
mated market value of $20.7 million.
17 
                                                                                    
17 While the emphasis of this research has been on agricultural land 
protection, the analysis has direct implications for Delaware’s forest 
and coastal protection efforts as well. 454    October 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
  An area for future research is how DALPF’s 
auction system affects the discount rate of offers 
over time. As discussed earlier, DALPF currently 
uses a sealed-bid discriminative auction structure 
(the landowner receives a sales price based on the 
percent discount offered). While this structure has 
intuitive appeal, it has been known in perfect-
information settings to engender price inflation in 
multiple rounds because a seller has an incentive 
to inflate the offer above his or her true willing-
ness to sell. Furthermore, the value of the smallest 
percentage discount from the previous cycle tends 
to establish a focal point that can discourage 
higher percent discount offers in future rounds. In 
the DALPF context, the worry is that these fac-
tors would lead to smaller discount rate offers 
over time, which would be suboptimal from a 
conservation perspective. Since the average dis-
count offered has been 42.3 percent, it appears 
that sellers to DALPF have been motivated by 
factors other than simple profit maximization. 
However, this trend may change over time and 
thus DALPF may want to explore the ability of 
alternative auction designs to ensure larger dis-
counts. A cost-effective environment for testing 
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The need for scaling variables that represent the 
parcel’s average benefit value can be illustrated 
by considering a hypothetical scenario of four 
parcels being considered for acquisition with a 
budget of $300,000. Recall that LESA scores are 
traditionally assigned to an entire parcel, and thus 
represent the agricultural suitability of an average 









score × acres) 
Acquisition 
Cost 
Parcel A    40    30    1,200    $120,000 
Parcel B    50    25    1,250    $100,000 
Parcel C    60    20    1,200    $80,000 
TOTAL 
(3 parcels) 
 150   75   3,650    $300,000 
Parcel D    100    100    10,000    $300,000 
TOTAL 
(1 parcel) 
 100      100   10,000    $300,000 
 
 
  Parcels A, B, and C each have a relatively low 
parcel LESA score (40 to 60 out of a possible 456    October 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
100), are small in size (ranging from 20 to 30 
acres), and have acquisition costs of $12,000, 
$10,000, and $8,000, respectively. In contrast, 
Parcel D is a 100-acre parcel with a parcel LESA 
score of 100 and an acquisition cost of $300,000. 
If the objective is to maximize LESA benefits, 
then without scaling the variable by the parcel 
size, the OPT would select the three small, low-
quality parcels at a total cost of $300,000, be-
cause these three parcels would yield a total 
LESA score of 150. In contrast, the total LESA 
score from spending the entire budget on Parcel 
D is just 100. However, this result is clearly not 
 
optimal from a real-world perspective because in-
dividually the three separate parcels had benefit 
scores that were individually 20 percent to 30 
percent as good as Parcel D, and combined they 
total only 75 acres. 
  Scaling the LESA score by the size of the par-
cel size (multiplying the parcel LESA score by 
the number of acres) solves this problem. In this 
case, by seeking to maximize the scaled benefit of 
LESA, the OPT would select Parcel D with its 
$300,000 budget since it yields a higher aggre-
gate score of 10,000 instead of 3,650. 
 
 
 
 
 